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Global Innovation Races, Offshoring and
Wage Inequality
Giammario Impullitti*
Abstract
In the 1970s and 1980s the US position as the global technological leader was increasingly challenged by
Japan and Europe. In those years the US skill premium and residual wage inequality increased substan-
tially. This paper presents a two-region, quality-ladder growth model where the lagging economy progres-
sively catches up with the leader. As the innovation gap closes, the advanced country experiences fiercer
foreign technological competition that forces its firms to innovate more. Faster technical change increases
the skill premium and residual inequality. Offshoring production and innovation plays a key role in shaping
the link between international competition and inequality.
1. Introduction
Wage inequality has increased rapidly in the USA in recent decades. The skill
premium, measured as the college/high school wage ratio, increased by approximately
20% from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, while residual wage inequality—the wage
dispersion across workers with similar observable characteristics—increased by about
15% over this period (Acemoglu and Autor 2010; Heathcote et al., 2010). At the same
time, American firms experienced fiercer international competition as Japanese and
European firms were progressively closing the gap with the US technology frontier.
Focusing on R&D investment as a proxy for innovation, there is evidence of a sub-
stantial change in the geographical distribution of innovation during this period: the
US share of global R&D investment in manufacturing sectors declined from about
50% in 1979 to 39% in 1995, while Japan’s share increased from 17% to 28% in the
same period (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Structural
Analysis database—OECD STAN). Although, the across-sector average for Europe is
fairly constant, in some innovation-intensive industries Europe’s share of global R&D
grows substantially in this period. Similar trends are observable for the distribution of
patent counts and citations (Cozzi and Impullitti, 2015; Akcigit et al., 2014). This sug-
gests that US global technological leadership was increasingly challenged by foreign
firms during the years of increasing wage inequality.
What is the role of foreign technological competition in shaping the dynamics of
US wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s? In this period US firms offshored a
non-negligible share of production and innovation activities.1 How does offshoring
affect the link between increasing foreign competition, technical change and wage
inequality?
This paper tackles these questions in a version of the quality-ladder growth model
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) in which a backward
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region progressively catches up with the leading region by increasing the number of
industries in which it participates in innovation races for global leadership. The
increase in international competition for innovation between the two regions affects
the incentive to innovate and wage inequality in the leading economy. The two
regions, domestic and foreign, share the same size and preferences, and their econo-
mies are populated with a continuum of monopolistic competitive sectors with firms
investing in innovation to improve the quality of goods. The top-quality firm in each
industry becomes the leader and supplier in a global economy without trade barriers.
The trade direction of each product may reverse over time as the identity of the
quality leader changes. The patterns of trade are determined by the number of sectors
in which each countries’ firms have technological leadership, which depends on firms’
past investment in innovation.
International technological competition is represented by the following feature of
the economy. I assume that the domestic region is the world leader in that its firms
invest in innovation in all sectors of the economy, while foreign firms innovate only in
few sectors. The share of sectors in which firms from both regions compete in innova-
tion is used as a measure of international competition. Each firm undertakes two
activities: production of goods using unskilled workers and innovation employing
skilled workers. Workers have heterogeneous abilities drawn from a fixed distribution.
They can decide to spend time in school in order to become skilled workers and
acquire a level of efficiency proportional to their innate ability. The presence of a fixed
cost of education determines the ability cutoff above which workers attain education.
Hence, the relative supply of skills is endogenous and responds to changes in the
skilled/unskilled wage ratio, the skill premium. Moreover, since skilled workers are
paid proportionally to the efficiency gained during their schooling period, the disper-
sion of skilled wages is affected by the cutoff ability level for obtaining education.
As foreign firms enter the global innovation race in a sector, with a probability pro-
portional to their innovation effort, they become the global quality leaders and pro-
duction shifts abroad. As a consequence, the domestic demand for production workers
declines, triggering a reduction in domestic unskilled wages. This wage-stealing effect
increases the skill premium in the domestic country directly by reducing unskilled
wages, and indirectly by increasing firms’ profits and therefore their incentive to inno-
vate. Since innovation is the skill-using activity, the increase in profits triggers an
increase in the relative demand of skills and in the skill premium. Finally, an increase
in the returns to education induces workers with lower ability to acquire education,
thereby increasing the ability dispersion of skilled workers and the dispersion of their
wages. Hence, stiffer international competition leads to higher residual inequality as
well as higher skill premium.
In the benchmark economy labor markets are assumed to be completely local and
firms cannot locate either production or innovation abroad. The wage-stealing effect is
strictly dependent on the assumption that labor markets are local. Does fiercer inter-
national technology competition affect inequality when firms are allowed to produce
and innovate abroad? To answer this question I introduce the possibility of offshoring
production and innovation at no additional cost. Offshoring allows firms to locate
their activities where factor prices are lower, thus leading to factor-price equalization.
Since labor markets are global in this economy, the wage-stealing channel cannot
operate but changes in international competition affect inequality through a new
mechanism: assuming that the innovation technology has decreasing returns at the
regional level, foreign entry in innovation in a sector leads to a more efficient interna-
tional allocation of innovation efforts, thereby increasing the global demand for skills
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and the skill premium.2 This is the “global efficiency” effect. As before, an increase in
the skill premium increases the share of skilled workers and reduces their average
ability, thus leading to higher residual inequality.3
In the quantitative analysis I use OECD STAN data on R&D investment in two
and three-digit manufacturing industries to construct an empirical measure of the
type of international competition presented in the model. The USA is the domestic
region and Japan and Europe represent the foreign region. The sectors where US
investment in research dominates global spending in innovation are labeled “gap”
sectors, while the sectors where innovation efforts are more evenly distributed across
countries are called “neck-and-neck”. The share of neck-and-neck sectors in the
economy is the empirical measure of international competition I focus on. The data
show that about 42% of sectors are neck-and-neck in 1979 rising to 68% in 1995.
Feeding the model the observed reduction in competition yields the following results:
under local labor markets, there is an increase in inequality accounting for about one-
sixth of the increase in the skill premium, and approximately 45% of the growth in
residual inequality observed between 1979 and 1995. In the economy with offshoring,
the observed increase in competition accounts for 7% of the increase in the skill
premium and about one-fifth of the growth in residual inequality. Although the real
economy lays in a middle ground between the two theoretical extremes of completely
local and completely global labor markets, my stylized economies provide a possible
lower and upper bound for the effects of foreign technological competition on
inequality.
Related Literature
The large literature on US wage inequality in recent decades focuses on two main
sources, globalization and technological change (see Hornstein et al., 2005; Acemoglu
and Autor, 2010, for a survey).4 One strand of the literature studies the effects of trade
liberalization on wage inequality when technology is given (e.g. Yeaple, 2005; Burstein
and Vogel, 2010), and another analyzes the interaction between trade liberalization,
technical change and wage inequality (e.g. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999;
Acemoglu, 2003; Epifani and Gancia, 2008). The present paper follows this second
line of research in that technology is endogenous, but analyzes a source of inequality
different from trade liberalization: the increase in international technological compe-
tition triggered by foreign entry in global innovation races.
The paper is closely related to the research on international technology diffusion
and innovation that studies how changes in the cost and speed of diffusion affect the
incentives to innovate in trading economies. Keller (2004) provides a comprehensive
survey of this large literature. Some examples are Helpman (1993), Eaton and Kortum
(1999, 2006), Rodriguez-Claire (2007) and Hsieh and Ossa (2011). Helpman (1993)
sets up a quality-ladder growth model with an innovating region (North) and an imi-
tating region (South) trading freely. Faster technology diffusion, represented by a
reduction in the imitation cost, spurs innovation by reducing wages—the cost of inno-
vation. Eaton and Kortum (1999) build a multi-country quality-ladder model in which
all countries innovate and contribute to the world technology frontier, and diffusion
depends on each country’s capacity to adopt foreign technologies. Following Eaton
and Kortum, in this paper both regions innovate but there is a reduced-form represen-
tation of technology diffusion: the exogenously given level of international techno-
logical competition can be thought of as the equilibrium outcome of different
adoption rates (or barriers to diffusion). This simple way of modeling diffusion allows
GLOBAL INNOVATION, OFFSHORING AND WAGES 3
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
GLOBAL INNOVATION, OFFSHORING ANDWAGES 173
VC 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
me to directly exploit the variation in the geographic distribution of R&D investment
obtainable from the OECD STAN data. Similarly, Krugman (1979) presents a diffu-
sion model in which the leading country is assumed to be able to produce virtually all
the goods in the economy, whereas the follower country can produce only the “old”
goods. As in the present article, both countries have the same preferences and tech-
nologies, and the difference in production possibilities is exogenous. Krugman sug-
gests that the source of the productive advantage of the leading economy might be
related to a more skilled labor force, external economies, or to a difference in “social
atmosphere.” In the case of the growing technological competition between the USA,
Europe and Japan that is analyzed here, one important exogenous source could be
innovation policy. US technology policy mainly targeting military innovations was key
in shaping US technological leadership in the post-World War II period (Nelson,
1993), while the aggressive industrial policy of the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) and some European success stories like Airbus, could be
at the root of these countries’ entry in global R&D races in the 1980s (see e.g. Tyson,
1992; Nelson, 1993).5
Impullitti (2010) uses a similar model of diffusion to explain the effects of foreign
competition on innovation and welfare, but assumes away any effect on the labor
market.6 Akcigit et al. (2014), analyze the effects of foreign competition owing to tech-
nology diffusion on welfare and on optimal innovation subsidies, in a multi-country
growth model with step-by-step innovation. The main contribution of this paper is
first, to provide a theory of how faster international technology competition affects
wage inequality—a channel that is not explored in the existing literature—and sec-
ondly, to quantify the contribution of this specific channel to the path of inequality
observed in US data. In a companion paper, Cozzi and Impullitti (2015) endogenize
international competition making it dependent on differences in innovation
technology/capabilities across countries. Similarly to what I do here, Cozzi and
Impullitti (2015) study the effects of increasing foreign technology competition on
innovation and wage inequality, but they focus on wage polarization across different
tasks (innovation, production and personal services), and do not consider the possibil-
ity of offshoring.
There is a growing body of work analyzing the effects of offshoring on wage
inequality. Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) among
others have highlighted channels through which trade in intermediates and offshoring
opportunities affect the skill premium. In this line of research the source of inequality
is represented by changes in the opportunity (cost) of offshoring, for a given level and
structure of technology. Acemoglu et al. (2015) contribute to the literature by intro-
ducing innovation and studying how lower offshoring costs affect the direction of
technical change, which in turn determines wage inequality.7 I follow a similar
approach in analyzing the interaction between offshoring and endogenous technology,
but I assume that all goods can be offshored and focus on how changes in interna-
tional competition affect innovation and inequality in the presence of offshoring.
Finally, the literature on globalization and inequality has mainly focused on one
measure of inequality—the skill premium—while little attention has been given to the
rise in residual inequality. The record increase of US wage dispersion across workers
with similar observable characteristics in recent decades8 has been mostly linked to
changes in the speed and structure of technological change (e.g. Acemoglu, 1999;
Caselli, 1999; Galor and Moav, 2000; Violante, 2002). I contribute to this literature by
analyzing how globalization, in the form of increasing technological competition,
affects innovation and the returns to observed and unobserved ability, thus shaping
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the dynamics of residual inequality. The model’s prediction that growth in residual
inequality is driven by increases in the share of educated workers in the population is
in line with the empirical results of Lemieux (2006). Using May Current Population
Survey (US Census) data, Lemieux shows that a large fraction of the increase in
residual inequality is attributable to an increasing dispersion of unobserved workers’
abilities in the 1980s, a period in which the workforce grows older and more educated.
2. Stylized Facts
In this section I introduce and discuss the data providing motivation for the paper as
well as empirical support for the quantitative analysis. First I discuss the dynamics of
the skill premium and residual inequality in the USA. Second, I explore the evolution
of countries’ shares of R&D investment at the industry level. As my interest is in
international competition among technological leaders, I restrict the attention to the
USA, Japan and 10 European countries: Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Sweden,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain and the Netherlands.9 I then build an index of coun-
tries’ “neck-and-neckness” in R&D; that is, I construct a measure of the share of
industries where domestic and foreign countries effectively compete for innovation.
This allows me to obtain an empirical measure for the international technological
competition defined in the model, which is used to perform quantitative analysis.
Wage Inequality
The returns to college show a drastic increase starting in the late 1970s, as shown
Figure 1. In 1978 the college premium is substantially equal to its value in 1963, with
college graduates earning about 50% more than high school graduates and dropouts.
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Figure 1. Skill Premium and Residual Inequality in the USA
Sources: Autor et al. (2008), Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) and Lemieux (2006).
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From 1979 to 1995 the college premium increases by about 21%, with college gradu-
ates earning about 80% more than workers with lower levels of education. Since I
interpret the returns to schooling as the true relative price of skills, the college
premium will be the definition of the skill premium in the paper.10
Figure 1 also shows the trend of residual inequality, measured as the variance of the
residuals from a Mincerian regression of log wages on observable characteristics of
workers, including education.11 Residual inequality is therefore a measure of wage dis-
persion across workers with similarly observable characteristic. The figure shows a
small increase before 1979 and, as in the case of the college premium, a steady
increase afterwards, scoring a 30% growth between 1979 and 1995.
Global R&D Investment and International Competition
I use OECD STAN Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Develoment
(ANBERD) database statistics on R&D investment for two- and three-digit manufac-
turing industries. Grouping together the 10 European countries, Figure 2 reports sec-
torial average R&D investment shares for the USA, Japan and Europe. The figure
shows that, while European countries as a whole kept a fairly constant share, the US
share declined substantially, from 52% to 39% between 1973 and 1995, while Japan’s
share increased from 17% to 28% in the same period.12 This suggests that the US posi-
tion as the global leader in R&D investment was increasingly challenged by Japanese
firms, while Europe’s share shows only a moderate increase. Figure 2 provides a clear
picture of convergence in global R&D efforts. Cozzi and Impullitti (2015) and Akcigit
et al. (2014), show that a similar convergence path can be observed for innovation
output, patents and its quality, patent citations.
0.6
0.55 United States
Europe
Japan
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
R
&
D
 S
ha
re
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Figure 2. Global R&D Shares
Source: OECD STAN.
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Table 1 reports countries’ shares in medium and high-tech sectors in 1973 and
1995.13 The US share declines in all sectors except for drugs and medicines, Japan’s
share scores record increases in the most innovative industries: in electrical machiner-
ies the share rises from 16.6% to 43.2% (a 160% increase), in office and computing
machineries from about 6% to about 30% (a 368% increase), and in radio, TV and
communication equipment from 13% to 25% (a 95% increase). Europe provides a
mixed picture with a substantial increase in aircraft (13% increase)—probably related
to the entry of AIRBUS in the global market for airplanes—and in motor vehicles
(16% increase), as well as decreases in chemicals and office and computing machiner-
ies. A similar picture can be obtained in medium and low-tech sectors that I do not
show for brevity.
This data can be used to build a measure of countries’ “neck-and-neckness” in inno-
vation. For each year, in the period 1973–1995, I consider a sector neck-and-neck if
the US share of total R&D investment is smaller than a certain threshold (NT hence-
forth). The measure of the neck-and-neck set of industries, that I call ω , is defined as
the percentage of sectors with the US R&D share below the threshold NT. I compute
ω for different threshold values in the grid NT ∈ (0.35, 0.68), and the final index is
chosen taking the average index across thresholds.14 This empirical index has been
built to match the definition of technological competition studied in the model pre-
sented in the next section.
Figure 3 shows the values of ω obtained using the bottom threshold NT = 0.35 and
the top threshold NT = 0.68; it also shows the average ω , which is computed taking
the mean of all the ωs obtained at each threshold levels in the set CT ∈ (0.35, 0.68).
All measures show an increasing trend, the average ω , which is the index of interna-
tional competition used in the quantitative analysis, increases from 0.3 (30% of the
sectors are neck-and-neck) in 1973 to 0.68 in 1995.15
As Figures 2 and 3 show, in the mid-1990s the convergence in R&D investment
across countries seems to be completed. Interestingly, the increase in US wage
inequality also slows down in that period (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2002; Acemoglu and
Autor, 2010). For this reason I focus the analysis on 1979–1995, the period of major
increase in inequality and faster innovation convergence.
Table 1. Global R&D Shares (medium/high-tech secs)
Industry
1973 1995 % change 1973–1995
US JAP EU US JAP EU US JAP EU
Aircraft** 74.2 0.08 0.241 68.4 1.4 27.3 −7.76 81.6 13.3
Chem. no drugs* 39.7 18.5 39.8 35.9 26.1 36.3 −9.38 40.6 −8.68
Drugs and meds** 41.3 14.5 42.2 45.5 16.8 34.6 10.1 15.7 −18
Electrical machinery* 54.3 16.6 27.8 24.6 43.2 30.8 −54.5 160.3 10.6
Motor vehicles* 56.5 13.6 28.8 45.01 20.1 33.51 −20.4 47.7 16.3
Office & computing
mach.**
76.5 6.4 16.1 53.7 30.2 13.98 −29.8 368.5 −13.2
Radio, TV & comm.
equip.*
54.2 13.1 29.9 40.3 25.6 28.76 −25.5 95.08 −3.93
Note: * medium high-tech ,** high tech.
Source: OECD STAN.
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3. The Model
In this section I set up the model and derive the steady-state equilibrium system of
equations. The model combines elements of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) and
Impullitti (2010). It embeds the quality-ladder growth structure with endogenous
human capital accumulation of the Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, but considers asym-
metric countries, as in Impullitti (2010), and explores global economies with and
without the possibility of offshoring production and innovation.
Households
The economy is populated by two regions with the same population and preferences.
In both regions there are heterogeneous households, differing in their ability to
acquire working skills θ ∈ (0, 1). Households have identical unit elastic preferences
for a continuum of consumption goods ω ∈ (0, 1), and each is endowed with a unit of
labor/study time whose supply generates no disutility. The household of type θ is
modeled as dynastic family that maximize intertemporal utility
U N e u t dtn t= ( ) ( )− −( )∞∫ 00 ρ θlog , (1)
where population is specified according to N(t) = N(0)ent, with initial population N(0)
normalized to 1 and a constant population growth rate n. The rate of time preference
is ρ, with ρ > n. The utility per person is given by
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Figure 3. International Technological Competition Index
Sources: OECD STAN and author’s calculations.
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log log , ,
max ,
u t q j t dj
j
j t
θ θ
ω
λ ω ω( ) ≡ ( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥=
( )
∑∫
0
0
1
(2)
where qθ(j, ω, t) is the per-member quantity of good ω ∈ [0, 1] of quality j ∈ {0, 1, 2,
. . .} purchased by a household of ability θ at time t ≥ 0. A new vintage of good ω yields
a quality λ times that of the previous vintage, with λ > 1. Different versions of the
same good ω are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting for their
quality ratios, and jmax(ω, t) denotes the maximum quality in which the good ω is avail-
able at time t.
At each point in time households choose the quantity purchased of each good
qθ(j, ω, t) in order to maximize (2) subject to the per-period expenditure constraint.
The utility function has unitary elasticity of substitution between every pair of
product lines. Thus, households maximize static utility by spreading their expenditures
cθ(t) evenly across product lines and by purchasing in each line only the product
with the lowest price per unit of quality.16 Hence, the household’s demand for each
product is:
q j t
c t
p j t
j j tθ
θω
ω
ω, ,
, ,
,max( ) = ( )( ) = ( )for  and is zero otherwise. (3)
Given the optimal allocation of expenditures across different product lines at a given
moment t in (3), the intertemporal optimization problem yields the Euler equation
c t
c t
r tθ
θ
ρ( )( ) = ( ) − . (4)
Individuals are finitely lived members of infinitely lived households, being continu-
ously born at rate β and dying at rate δ, with β − δ = n > 0; V > 0 denotes the exog-
enous duration of their life.17 They choose to acquire education and become skilled, if
at all, at the beginning of their lives, and the duration of their schooling period, during
which the individual cannot work, is set at Tr < V. In region K = D (domestic), F
(foreign) an individual with ability θ decides to acquire education if and only if:
e w s ds e w s ds
r d
L
K
t
t V r d
H
K
t Tr
t
s
t
s
− ( )+ − ( )
+
∫ ∫( ) < −( ) ( )∫ τ τ τ τ θ γmax , 0t V+∫ , (5)
with 0 < γ < 1 defining a threshold ability requirement so that an agent with ability
θ > γ is able to accumulate θ − γ units of skills after schooling, while a person with
ability below γ gains no skills from education. Parameter γ could be interpreted as an
ability-specific fixed cost of education.18
I focus on steady-state analysis, in which all variables grow at constant rate and wL,
wH and cθ are all constant. From the Euler equation (4) we obtain r(t) = ρ at all dates,
and solving (5) with equality implies that agents acquire education if and only if their
ability is higher than the following cutoff
θ γ σ γρ ρ ρ0 1K V Tr V L
K
H
K
L
K
H
K
e e e
w
w
w
w
= −( ) −( )[ ] + ≡ +− − − . (6)
with σ ρ ρ ρ≡ −( ) −( )[ ]− − −1 e e eV Tr V . I assume that agents draw their innate ability from a
cumulative distribution function Γ(θ). This implies that Γ θ0K( ) is the share of region K
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population deciding to not acquire education, and
L t N tK K( ) ≡ ( ) ( )Γ θ0 (7)
is the supply of unskilled labor at time t. A fraction 1 0− ( )( )Γ θK of the population
decides to attain education and the skilled workforce is represented by the subset of
these agents that have completed their schooling period, that is individuals born
between t − V and t − Tr. The supply of skilled labor in efficiency units at time t is then
H t N tK K K K( ) = ( ) − ( )( ) ( )θ θ θ φ0 01 Γ , (8)
with 0 1 1 1< ≡ −( ) −( ) <−( )φ e en V Tr nV and
θ θ θ γ θ
θθ
K K K
K
d
K0
0
1
10
( ) = −( ) ( )
− ( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥∫
Γ
Γ
(9)
is the average ability of educated workers. In steady state the growth rate of LK(t) and
HK(t) is equal to n for K = D, F .
Production
In each region, firms can hire unskilled workers to produce any consumption good
ω ∈ [0, 1] under a constant return to scale technology with one worker producing one
unit of product. The unskilled wage rate is wLK and I set wLF = 1, so that the unskilled
foreign wage is the numeraire of this economy. As we saw in the previous section, only
the top quality of each good is demanded by consumers, therefore in each industry
only the product with the highest quality is produced. Quality leaders in each sector
are challenged by followers that employ skilled workers to discover the next top-
quality product. In this model, as in the baseline quality-ladder growth model, leaders
and followers have the same production and innovation technology, thus the Arrow
effect implies that in equilibrium only followers innovate.19 Successful innovation
yields global market leadership that is protected by a perfectly enforceable patent
law.
I assume that the technologies to produce goods one quality ladder below the top
are obsolete and diffuse freely. This assumption allows foreign successful innovators
to become global market leaders.20 The unit elastic demand structure encourages the
monopolist to set the highest possible price to maximize profits, while the existence of
a competitive fringe sets a ceiling equal to the world’s lowest unit cost of the immedi-
ately inferior good on the quality ladder. Thus, the profit-maximizing price of the
quality leader is a limit price on the cost of the follower (competitive fringe).
In order to determine the optimal pricing I anticipate a fundamental feature of the
model that will be discussed more in depth in the next two sections. I assume that
domestic firms invest in innovation and compete for market leadership in all sectors
of the economy, while foreign firms invest only in a subset of sectors. The share of
industries in which domestic and foreign firms invest in innovation is the measure of
international technological competition I focus on. I call these industries “neck-and-
neck”, while the remaining industries in the product space are the “gap” industries.
Hence, a larger share of neck-and-neck industries implies a stronger international
competition to achieve global market leadership. Since domestic firms can potentially
be leaders in all sectors of the economy, they produce more and demand more
10 Giammario Impullitti
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unskilled labor, thus paying higher wages. To obtain a non-trivial market structure I
focus on the equilibrium in which the gap between the two countries’ unskilled wage
is constrained by the following condition, w w wLD LF LDλ ≤ ≤ . This narrow gap case
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991) allows for equilibrium product-cycle trade with
global market leadership shifting from domestic to foreign firms as the latter innovate
and vice versa. Although the foreign region has a cost advantage in production, focus-
ing on the narrow gap case guarantees that the wage gap is not so large that a foreign
follower can price a domestic leader out of the market without innovating.21
Since both domestic and foreign followers operate with the same technology, and
foreign unskilled labor is cheaper, domestic followers do not represent an effective
competitive threat in sectors where firms from both countries are active in innovation.
Thus the price pK(jmax(ω, t), ω, t) of a top-quality good is
p j t t w tK LFmax , , ,ω ω λ λ( )( ) = ( ) = (10)
in neck-and-neck sectors for K = D, F . In gap sectors, the competitive fringe cost is the
domestic wage and limit pricing leads to
p j t t w tD LDmax , , , .ω ω λ( )( ) = ( ) (11)
From (3), we can conclude that the demand for each product ω is:
c t c t N t
p j t t
q t
D F
K
( ) + ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) = ( )max , , , , ,ω ω ω (12)
where c t c t dD D( ) ( ) ( )∫= 01 θ θΓ and c t c t dF F( ) = ( ) ( )∫ θ θΓ01 are average per-capita expendi-
tures at time t. Letting q(ω, t) be the quantity produced of good ω, the above equation
implies that supply and demand of goods are equal in equilibrium. It follows that the
stream of monopoly profits accruing to domestic quality leaders in neck-and-neck
industries is
π ω ω λ λn
D
L
F
L
D D F L
D
t q t w w t c t c t N t
w t
, ,( ) = ( ) − ( )( ) = ( ) + ( )( ) ( ) − ( )⎛⎝⎜1 ⎞⎠⎟ ,
where I have used (3) to substitute for q(ω, t). Profits of domestic leaders in gap indus-
tries are
π ω ω λ λg
D
L
D
L
D D Ft q t w t w t c t c t N t, , ,( ) = ( ) ( ) − ( )( ) = ( ) + ( )( ) ( ) −( )1 1
and profits of foreign leaders are πF(ω, t) = (cD(t) + cF(t))N(t)(1 − 1/λ).
Innovation Races and the Value of a Firm
In each industry, quality followers employ skilled workers to produce a probability
intensity of inventing the next top-quality version of their products. The arrival rate of
innovation in industry ω at time t is I(ω, t), which is the sum of the Poisson arrival rate
of innovation produced by all firms targeting product ω. The innovation technology
available to a firm i in region K for innovation in sector ω is
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I t
Ah t
H t
X t
X t
i
K
i
K
K
ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
α
,
,
,
,
,
,( ) =
( ) ( )( )
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
( )
−
(13)
where X(ω, t) > 0 measures the degree of complexity innovation, α > 0,
H t h tK i iKω ω, ,( ) = ∑ ( ) and I t I tK i iKω ω, ,( ) = ∑ ( ) are total skilled labor and total
innovation rate in sector ω and region K respectively. This technology implies that
each firm’s instantaneous probability of success is a decreasing function of the total
domestic labor resources devoted to innovation in an industry. A possible interpreta-
tion of this property is that when firms increase innovation inputs in a sector, the
probability of duplicative innovation effort also increases, thereby reducing the prob-
ability that any single firm will discover the next vintage of goods. Therefore, the
sector-specific negative externality in innovation technology produces decreasing
returns to innovation at the industry level. Moreover, (13) implies that this negative
externality is also region specific;22 this feature can be motivated by the presence of
fixed costs, such as laboratory equipment, by institutional differences, and by the pres-
ence of a workforce with heterogeneous ability in research.23
The complexity index X(ω, t) is introduced to avoid the counterfactual prediction of
the first generation innovation-driven growth models that the size of a region affects
its steady-state growth (Jones, 1995). Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) I
eliminate scale effects assuming X(ω, t) = 2κN(t), with κ > 0, thereby formalizing the
idea that it is harder to innovate in a more crowded global market.24
Each innovating firm chooses liK in order to maximize its expected discounted
profits. Free entry into innovation races drives profits to zero yielding
v t A
H t
X t
X t w tK
K
H
Kω
ω
ω
ω
α
,
,
,
, .( ) ( )( )
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ ( ) = ( )
−
(14)
where vK(ω, t) is the value of a firm in sector ω and region K. This condition states that
the cost of one unit of skilled labor employed in innovation wHK must be equal to its
benefits, represented by the marginal product A(HK(ω, t)/X(ω, t))−α/X(ω, t) times the
prize for a successful innovation vK(ω, t).
Efficient financial markets channel savings into innovative firms that issue a secu-
rity paying the monopoly profits if they win the race and zero otherwise. Since there is
a continuum of industries, and simultaneous and independent innovation races, con-
sumers can perfectly diversify away risk: the expected rate of return of a stock issued
by a firm is equal to the riskless rate of return r(t). It is easy to show that this leads to
the following value of a firm
v t
t
r t I t v t v t
K
K
K K
ω
π ω
ω ω ω
,
,
, , ,
,( ) = ( )( ) + ( ) − ( ) ( ) (15)
where I(ω, t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will
destroy the monopolist’s profits in industry ω. This is the Schumpeterian rate of crea-
tive destruction, the expected value of a patent is inversely proportional to total inno-
vation in the industry. Substituting for the value of the firm from (15) into (14) and
using (13) to express the amount of skilled workers in terms of the innovation rate we
obtain the following conditions
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π ω
ω ω ω
ω
ω
α
αK
K K
Kt
r t I t v t v t
I t
A
A
X t
,
, , ,
,
,
( )
( ) + ( ) − ( ) ( )
( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
−
−

1
( ) = ( )w tH
K , (16)
for ω ∈ (0,1) and K = D, F . This condition, together with the Euler equation summa-
rizes the utility maximizing household choice of consumption, savings and education,
and the profit-maximizing choice of production and innovation. Innovation arrival
rates determine the evolution of the average quality of goods in the economy
O t I d d
t( ) = ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦∫∫ln ,λ ω τ τ ω001 , obtained from the preferences in (2).
International Technological Competition
International competition is defined in the model by the share of industries where
firms from both regions compete in innovation. I assume that there exists an exog-
enously given subset of industries ω ∈( )0 1, where domestic and foreign researchers
compete to discover the next vintage of products, while in the complementary 1−ω
industries only domestic firms compete for innovation. This leads to the following
composition of worldwide investment in innovation,
I t I t I tnD Fω ω ω ω ω, , ,( ) = ( ) + ( ) ≤for
I t I tgDω ω ω ω, ,( ) = ( ) >for (17)
where I tgD ω,( ) is innovation in sectors where only domestic firms compete to improve
a product’s quality, and I tnD ω,( ) is domestic innovation in industries in which foreign
firms compete in innovation as well; IF(ω, t) is foreign innovation.
The set of sectors ω could be obtained as an equilibrium result by, for instance,
introducing heterogeneous innovation technologies across industries and countries, as
shown in Impullitti (2010) and Cozzi and Impullitti (2015).25 For tractability I consider
ω exogenous but, in order to keep in mind this interpretation of heterogeneous indus-
tries, I call goods in the set ω ω≤ neck-and-neck industries and those in the set 1−ω
gap industries. Besides tractability, there is another reason to consider ω exogenous:
the paper is motivated by the evidence discussed in section 2 showing that US leader-
ship in R&D investment is increasingly challenged by Japan and Europe in the period
considered. The goal of the paper is to build the simplest model that allows to exploit
that evidence. Introducing heterogeneous technologies would require data on innova-
tion technology at the region and sector level, which are not available.26
Since goods ω ∈ (0, 1) are symmetric (same technologies, both in production and
innovation, and enter symmetrically in the utility function), the only source of struc-
tural asymmetry between the two countries is represented by the partition of sectors
in neck-and-neck and gap. Therefore we can write, I t I tgD gDω,( ) = ( ) for all ω ω> ,
I t I tnD nDω,( ) = ( ) and IF(ω, t) = IF(t) for all ω ω≤ .
Labor Markets
To close the model we need to introduce the labor market clearing conditions and
trade balance. I analyze two different benchmark economies. In one offshoring is not
possible and, consequently, labor markets for both types of workers are local. In the
second scenario instead, firms can offshore both innovation and production at no
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additional costs, leading to perfectly global labor markets for skilled and unskilled
workers, and to equalization of factor prices across regions.
Local labor markets The production technology specified above implies that the
demand for unskilled workers is equal to total production of goods in each national
economy. For the domestic region the unskilled labor market clearing condition is
Γ θ λ ωβ
ω
0
1D
D F
L
D
c t c t
t
w t
( ) = ( ) + ( )( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ ( ) +
−( )
( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ , (18)
where the left-hand side is the population adjusted domestic supply of unskilled
workers from (7), and the right-hand side is the domestic demand for unskilled
workers. The variable β(t) indicates the fraction of neck-and-neck industries with a
domestic leader. The structure of global innovation activity specified in (17) implies
that β(t) evolves according to the law of motion
β β βt t I t t I tnD F( ) = − ( )( ) ( ) − ( ) ( )1 , (19)
where the first term on the right-hand side is the flow into β-type industries and the
second is the flow out. Hence, the relative strength of domestic innovation determines
domestic leadership in neck-and-neck industries. Equation (18) shows that a higher ω
leads to a higher global market share of domestic firms and, consequently, to a higher
domestic demand for unskilled workers. Similarly for the foreign region we have
Γ θ λ ω β0 1
F
D Fc t c t
t( ) = ( ) + ( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ − ( )( ). (20)
The market clearing condition for skilled workers in the domestic region is
θ θ θ φ κ ω ω
α
D D D n
D
g
DI t
A
I t
A
0 0
1 1
1 = 2 1( ) − ( )( ) ( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ + −( )
( )⎛⎝⎜
−( )
Γ ⎞⎠⎟
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
−( )1 1
,
α
(21)
where the left-hand side is the domestic supply of skilled labor (per capita) from (8),
and the right-hand side is the domestic demand for skilled workers obtained from
(13) and X(ω, t) = 2κN(t). Similarly, the skilled labor market clearing condition for the
foreign region is
θ θ θ φ κω
α
F F F
FI t
A
0 0
1 1
1 2( ) − ( )( ) = ( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
−( )
Γ . (22)
To close the model we need to introduce the conditions for balanced trade: in each
region total expenditures plus savings (investment in innovation) must equal national
income, wages plus profits (or interest income on assets). The trade balance condition
is
w t c t
w t
c t c t
H
D D D D D
L
D D
D F
( ) ( ) − ( )( ) + ( )
= ( ) ( ) + ( ) + ( )
θ θ θ φ
θ λ
0 0
0
1
1
Γ
Γ −( ) −( ) + − ( )( ) ( )[ ]ω λ ω λ β1 w t tLD , (23)
for the domestic region and
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w t c t
c t c t
H
F F F F F F
D F
( ) ( ) − ( )( ) + ( ) = ( ) + ( ) + ( ) −( )θ θ θ φ θ λ ω λ0 0 01 1 1Γ Γ − ( )( )β t , (24)
for the foreign region. Notice that investment in innovation is simply the wage bill of
skilled workers and that each region appropriates the monopoly rent associated to
quality leadership in the subset of industries where that region is the world leader.
Offshoring: global labor markets Next, I consider an economy in which both produc-
tion and innovation activities can be offshored. In order to keep the model tractable I
focus on the simple case in which production and innovation can be offshored at no
additional cost. The first implication of full offshoring is that both labor markets will
be perfectly global, thus leading to factor-price equalization (FPE henceforth), imply-
ing w t w tLD LF( ) = ( ) = 1, w t w t w tHD HF H( ) = ( ) ≡ ( ), and consequently θ θ θ0 0 0D F= ≡ . FPE and
free entry in innovation imply that innovation in neck-and-neck sectors is equalized,
that is I t I t I tnD F n( ) = ( ) ≡ ( ). The possibility of locating production and innovation
abroad changes the labor market clearing conditions described above as follows: there
is only one market clearing condition determining the equilibrium of the global
market for unskilled workers,
2 0Γ θ λ
( ) = ( ) + ( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
c t c tD F
, (25)
and one equilibrium condition for the global market for skilled labor,
2 1 2 2 10 0
1 1 1 1
θ θ θ φ κ ω ω
α
( ) − ( )( ) = ( )( ) + −( ) ( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟−( ) −Γ I tA I tAn gD α( )⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪ ⎫⎬⎪⎭⎪. (26)
4. Steady-State Equilibrium
A balanced growth path for this economy is an equilibrium in which per-capita vari-
ables are constant, the share of industries with a domestic leader is constant, the share
of population acquiring skills is constant, and the average quality of goods grows at a
constant rate. Since wages are constant in steady state, the free entry condition (14)
and X(ω, t) = 2κN(t) imply that  v t v t X t X t nK Kω ω ω ω, , , ,( ) ( ) = ( ) ( ) = , for K = D, F
and for all ω ∈ (0, 1). Per-capita expenditure is constant in steady state, then the Euler
equation (4) yields r(t) = ρ. The global distribution of innovation and the equations
for profits specified above imply that conditions (16) become
v
c c w
I I n
A I
A
wD
D F
L
D
n
D F
n
D
H
Dω
λ
ρ κ
ω
α
α( ) = +( ) −( )
+ + −
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−
−1
2
1
, for ≤ ω
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c c
I I n
A I
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wF
D F
n
D F
F
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Fω
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ρ κ
ω ω
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v
c c
I n
A I
A
wD
D F
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D
g
D
H
Dω
λ
ρ κ
ω ω
α
α( ) = +( ) −( )
+ −
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ = >
−
−1 1
2
1
, ,for
where I have used X(ω, t) = 2κN(t), r(t) = ρ, and v t v t nK Kω ω, ,( ) ( ) = .
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The steady-state version of the labor market clearing conditions (18), (20), (21), and
(22) can be obtained by simply dropping the time index and considering that in steady
state (19) implies β = +( )I I InD nD F . Similarly the trade balance conditions (23), (24)
can be obtained by simply dropping the time index and using the steady-state values
for β and θ0K . Using (6) to express θ0K as a function of wages, the equilibrium system is
composed of nine equations, (27), the steady-state versions of (18)–(22), (23) and (24),
and eight unknowns c c I I I w w wD F gD nD F HD LD HF, , , , , , ,( ). This is a general equilibrium
model, thus for the Walras law we can solve for eight equations and eight unknowns.
Factor-price equalization in the economy with offshoring leads to a simpler equilib-
rium system. With global wages, domestic and foreign firms’ values in neck-and-neck
sectors are equalized, vD(ω) = vF(ω) for ω ω≤ , leading to equal innovation,
I I IF nD n= ≡ . Equations (27) then become
c c
I n
A I
A
w
D F
n
n
H
+( ) −( )
+ − ( ) = ≤−−1 12 2 1λρ κ ω ωαα , for (28)
c c
I n
A I
A
w
D F
g
D
g
D
H
+( ) −( )
+ −
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ = >
−
−1 1
2
1λ
ρ κ
ω ω
α
α
, .for
The other equilibrium conditions are the steady-state versions of global market clear-
ing conditions (25)–(26) and trade balance (23)–(24). Using (6) to express θ0K as a
function of wages, the equilibrium system is composed of six equations, (28), the
steady-state versions of (25)–(26) and (23)–(24), and five unknowns (cD, cF, Ig, In, wH).
The Walras law allows us to solve for five equations and five unknowns.
I complete the description of the model by deriving the two measures of inequality
I focus on, the skill premium and residual inequality. The skill premium, defined as the
average wage of skilled workers over the unskilled wage is
s
w
w
K H
K K K
L
K
=
( )θ θ0 (29)
where θ θK K0( ) is the average efficiency units of a skilled worker defined in (9). Wage
dispersion in the economy is pinned down by the dispersion of skilled wages. Since the
wage of a skilled worker with ability θ is w wHD D HDθ θ γ( ) = −( ) , residual inequality is the
variance of wHD θ( ),
resK K
K
K Kd
K= ( ) = −( ) ( )
− ( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ − ( )[ ]∫var .θ θ γ
θ
θ
θ θ
θ
2
0
1
0
2
10
Γ
Γ
 (30)
5. Foreign Competition, Innovation and Wages: Analytical Results
In this section I derive a few analytical results providing some key intuitions for the
effects of an increase in international competition on innovation and wages in the
home country. In the following section I calibrate the model and explore its properties
numerically.
Local Labor Markets
To gain some intuition we derive analytical results for a simplified version of the
model where technology is constant. The purpose of this exercise is to highlight the
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mechanism behind the wage-stealing effect of international competition, which does
not hinge on the presence of endogenous technical change. As we will see in the
numerical analysis this channel will be present in the full model with innovation as
well. Assuming constant technology implies that there is only one activity, production,
and both types of workers are used in this activity. Since in this case workers operate
the same constant returns technology, there is only one wage in each national
economy, the production wage, and no incentive to obtain education. The equilibrium
is characterized by the steady-state version of the unskilled labor market clearing con-
ditions (18) and (20), and by trade balance (23)–(24), yielding the equilibrium values
of cD, cF and wD. The labor market clearing conditions, modified to take into account
that workers do not acquire education and that technology is constant, are
L
c c
w
L
c cD
D F
L
D
F
D F
=
+⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ +
−( )⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥ =
+⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ −( )λ ωβ
ω
λ ω β
1
1and ,
where the labor supply is simply proportional to population LK = NK, and for simplic-
ity we assume LD = LF. Since there is no innovation, we assume that with exogenous
probability β domestic firms are the global leaders in neck-and-neck sectors ω , and
with probability 1 − β the leadership is obtained by foreign firms. Combining these
two equations we obtain
w
l
L
D
=
−( )
−( ) −
1 1
1
ω
ω β β , (31)
where l = ND/NF = 1 is the relative population. It is easy to see that dw dLD ω < 0.
PROPOSITION 1. In an economy with constant technology and no offshoring, a larger
number of neck-and-neck sectors ω leads to lower domestic wages.
An increase in the fraction of sectors in which both domestic and foreign firms obtain
a share of the global market reduces domestic wages. This is the wage-stealing effect
of increasing foreign competition: as foreign firms enter new sectors in which previ-
ously only domestic firms were operating, with some positive probability β production
shifts abroad and the domestic labor market clears at a lower wage. This admittedly
harsh simplification for the model with local labor markets serves the sole purpose of
illustrating the wage-stealing effect. In the next section, we calibrate the full model
with local labor markets and show that this result holds also with endogenous technol-
ogy. With endogenous technology, the share of sectors with domestic leaders is an
equilibrium result of global innovation races, and an increase in ω shifts a fraction of
production abroad, thereby reducing the domestic demand for unskilled labor.
Offshoring
Factor-price equalization attained in the economy with offshoring simplifies the model
substantially and allows us to derive the effects of foreign competition on inequality
analytically. The results are summarized below.
PROPOSITION 2. In an economy with complete offshoring an increase in foreign com-
petition, triggered by a larger number of neck-and-neck sectors ω , stimulates innova-
tion, thereby raising the relative skilled wage (wH) and decreasing the ability cutoff θ0
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in both regions. If the ability distribution is logconcave, a reduction in θ0 increases the
variance of skilled wages, thus raising residual inequality.
PROOF. See Appendix. □
The transmission mechanism from competition to inequality here is due to the
endogenous technology feature of the model. Innovation increases with ω because
global innovation in neck-and-neck sectors is higher than in gap sectors, 2I In gD> ,
therefore the total labor resources devoted to innovation, the right-hand side of (26),
increases with ω . This is what I call the global efficiency effect and it operates through
the decreasing returns to innovation featured in technology (13): the region-level con-
cavity of the innovation technology implies that in each industry, two skilled workers
from two different regions are more productive than two skilled workers from the
same region. Thus, a higher ω leads to a larger number of sectors with higher arrival
rate of innovation and, consequently, to higher demand for skills worldwide. Notice
that the positive impact of a higher ω on global innovation could be offset by a nega-
tive effect on sectorial innovation rates In and IgD. As I show in the Appendix,
although ∂ ∂IgD ω and ∂ ∂In ω are both negative, the composition effect dominates,
thus leading to an overall positive effect of foreign competition on global innovation.27
Equation (6), shows that an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers wH/wL,
raises the return to education and reduces the ability cutoff θ0 to choose education,
thus increasing the share of skilled workers in the workforce. As a consequence,
workers with lower ability enter the skilled workforce. If the ability distribution is
logconcave—a property of many common distributions—a reduction in the cutoff θ0
increases the variance of skilled wages, our measure of residual inequality.28
Logoconcavity is only a sufficient condition for the wage variance to be decreasing in
θ0. In the quantitative analysis I choose a distribution among those that can be
logconcave under the restrictions of the parameter and I let the calibration pin down
the value of the parameters.
Finally, since an increase in skilled wages triggers a reduction in θ0, thereby leading
to a lower average ability of skilled workers, I cannot show analytically that higher ω
leads to higher average skill premium (wH θ θ0( )). The quantitative analysis that
follows shows that the skill premium, as defined in (29), is increasing in competition
for a wide set of plausible parameters.
Note that the complete absence of the wage-stealing effect in the economy with
offshoring depends on the assumption that firms can offshore at no costs. This is a sim-
plifying assumption that allows me to show the new channel, the global efficiency
effect, as clearly as possible. Introducing costly offshoring would not change the basic
result. The labor market would be only partially global, both the wage-stealing and the
global-efficiency effects will be operative, and their relative strength will be deter-
mined by the offshoring costs. Multi-country quality-ladder growth models with costly
offshoring became quickly intractable if one wants to maintain the key feature that
both economies innovate.29
6. Quantitative Analysis
In this section I calibrate the parameters of the model to match some basic long-run
empirical regularities of the US economy, compute the numerical solution using the
calibrated parameters and explore the effects of increasing international competition
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on wage inequality. I first analyze the model for the economy with local labor markets
and then study the economy with offshoring.
Calibration
I assume that abilities are drawn from the cumulative distribution function Γ(θ) = θε.
This is a fairly general distribution function in (0, 1): when ε = 1, the ability is distrib-
uted uniformly in the population, when ε < 1 the ability distribution is skewed towards
low-ability workers, and for ε > 1 the ability distribution is logconcave.30 I need to cali-
brate ten parameters: six of them, ρ, λ, n, Tr, γ and V are calibrated using benchmarks
that are standard in the literature, while the other four, A, k, α and ε are calibrated
internally so that the model’s steady state matches salient facts of the economy. In the
quantitative analysis, I explore the effects of the increase in the international competi-
tion index shown in Figure 3 on inequality from 1979 to 1995. Instead of comparing
two steady states, corresponding to the initial and final value of international competi-
tion, we show our key endogenous variables for each intermediate value of interna-
tional competition to provide a more complete numerical characterization of this
comparative statics.
Parameters calibrated “externally” Some parameters of the model have close coun-
terparts in real economies so that their calibration is straightforward. I set λ to 1.4, to
match an average markup over the marginal cost of 40%. Since, estimates of average
sectorial mark-up are in the interval (0.1, 0.4) (Basu, 1996), I take a value within this
range.31 I choose n to match a population growth rate of 1.14% (Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, 1999). I choose the total schooling time Tr = 4 to match the average years of
college in the USA, and total working life V = 52 to match a life expectancy at birth
for cohorts turning 18 years old in 1979 of 70 years (National Vital Statistics Reports,
2010).32 Autor et al. (2008) show that the relative supply of skills (college and above
over non-college) rises from 0.138 in 1970 to 0.25 in 1990. I follow this evidence by
choosing the threshold γ = 0.75 to bound the relative supply of skilled workers below
25% of the workforce. I set the discount rate equal to ρ = 0.07, which corresponds to
an annual discount factor of about 93%.
Parameters calibrated “internally” I simultaneously choose A, κ, α and ε so that the
numerical steady-state solution of the model matches relevant US statistics. The cali-
brated values of parameters for the economy with local labor markets must be differ-
ent from those for the economy with offshoring. In this section, I match the data to
the theoretical moments from the model with local labor markets, and at the end of
section 6 I consider the model with offshoring. A, α and κ are technology parameters
relevant for innovation, the demand for skills and the skill premium. The shape
parameter of the ability distribution ε affects the skill premium and wage dispersion.
Hence I choose to calibrate A, κ, α and ε targeting the following statistics: the overall
growth rate of the economy, the innovation investment share of income, the skill
premium and residual inequality.33 The parameters are calibrated in order to minimize
a loss function defined by the quadratic distance between the moments in the model
and the targeted statistics.
Since the paper focuses on innovation, it seems natural to use data from Corrado
et al. (2009), where US national account data have been revised to introduce invest-
ment in intangible capital, a new more comprehensive measure of investment in inno-
vation.34 The model I set up does not have tangible (physical) capital, therefore
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national accounting statistics used in the calibration must be adapted to the model
economy. Hence, the growth rate of productivity is obtained subtracting the share
attributable to tangible capital from the overall growth rate, and the income share of
intangible investment is obtained subtracting investment in tangible capital from
national income. After these adjustments Corrado et al. (2009) data report an average
growth of labor productivity of 1.17% a year in the period 1970–1979, and an average
income share of intangible investment of 0.09 in the same period. I target a skill
premium of 0.4 (in logs), which is the 1979 value in Autor et al. (2008), and a residual
inequality of 0.05, the 1979 data point of Figure 1 obtained with data from Heathcote
et al. (2010) and Lemieux (2006). Finally, in order to calibrate ω I use the 1979 value
for the international competition index obtained in Figure 3 above, hence I set
ω = 0 425. . The resulting calibrated values are A = 1.5, κ = 0.95, α = 0.1 and ε = 0.9.
Table 2 shows how well the model fits the US data at the initial data, 1979.
The calibrated model fits the targeted statistics fairly closely.
International Competition and Wage Inequality: Local Labor Markets
I now analyze the effects of increasing international competition from its benchmark
calibrated value ω = 0 425. to full symmetry (ω = 1) on the skill premium and on
residual inequality in the economy without offshoring. Figure 4 below reports the
simulation results using the benchmark parameters, the robustness of the results to
change of parameters is analyzed in a separate Appendix, available upon request.
The wage-stealing effect, derived analytically for a simplified version of the model
with constant technology in the previous section, is confirmed in the numerical simu-
lation of the full model. Foreign entry in innovation in new sectors shifts market
shares abroad and reduces production wages in the home region. This can be easily
seen looking at the demand for domestic unskilled labor, the right-hand side of (18):
an increase in ω raises the share of industries for which global leadership is shared
according to countries’ relative innovation intensity β = I I InD nD F+( ), therefore
reducing the domestic demand for unskilled labor. Notice that this result is not simply
produced by competition from a region with lower production wages. The
Schumpeterian innovation structure built in the model implies that global leadership
can be attained only producing a higher quality good. In existing multi-country
models of endogenous technical change, wage-stealing from foreign competition is
obtained as the lagging country imitates the leading technology and replaces the
leading country’s firm because of lower wages (e.g. Helpman, 1993). The novelty of
the current model is to allow for technological leapfrogging: in order to become the
world leader, the lagging country’s firm must innovate and produce a higher quality
good.
Endogenous technical change plays an additional role in shaping the effects of
foreign competition on inequality. Foreign entry in innovation reduces domestic
Table 2. Model Fit (1979)
Targeted Data Source Benchmark model
Skill premium (logs) 0.4 Autor et al. (2008) 0.5
Growth rate 0.0117 Corrado et al. (2009) 0.011
Innovation/GDP 0.09 Corrado et al. (2009) 0.09
Residual inequality 0.05 Heathcote et al. (2010) 0.017
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unskilled wages in neck-and-neck sectors. Lower unskilled wages imply lower produc-
tion costs and therefore higher domestic profit rate in those industries (λ − wLD is the
markup), as we can see in the figure. Since innovation is profit-driven, innovation in
neck-and-neck sectors InD increases, boosting the domestic demand for skills and the
skill premium.35 Hence international wage stealing increases the skill premium in the
domestic region directly, because it reduces unskilled wages and indirectly, because it
increases the incentive to innovate.
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Figure 4. International Competition and Inequality: No-offshoring
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Besides its effect on firm-level innovation efforts, international competition can
affect innovation and the relative demand of skills by changing the sectorial composi-
tion of innovation. It is easy to show that domestic firms invest less in innovation in
neck-and-neck sectors, I InD gD< : dividing up the first and the third condition in (27), we
obtain
λ
λ
ρ
ρ
α
α
−( )
−( )
+ −
+ + −
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−w I n
I I n
I
I
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D
g
D
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D F
n
D
g
D1
1
.
Since domestic unskilled wage is higher than foreign, λ λ−( ) −( ) <wLD 1 1, domestic
innovation must be higher in gap sectors, I IgD nD> . This result depends on the different
obsolescence of innovation in the two types of sectors: in neck-and-neck sectors there
is less domestic innovation because the equilibrium value of a patent needs to accom-
modate foreign innovation as well. Domestic demand for skilled workers in (21) is a
weighted average of InD and IgD with weights ω and 1−ω respectively, hence an
increase in ω reduces total domestic demand for skills and consequently the skill
premium. Quantitatively, this composition effect seems to be of second order and the
wage-stealing channel seems to be the key driver of the link between international
competition and inequality.
The mechanism through which increases in foreign competition affect residual
inequality is the one described in section 5: a larger skill premium implies higher
returns to education, leading to a lower ability cutoff θ0D and to a higher dispersion of
skilled wages.36 The empirical evidence in Lemieux (2006) shows that a similar
channel has been driving the increase in US residual inequality in the 1980s. He shows
that a large fraction of the growth in residual inequality in the 1980s is driven by an
increasing dispersion of workers’ abilities, which in turn can be attributed to a growing
share of educated workforce.
Although the main scope of the paper is to study the response of inequality in the
domestic region to increasing international competition, it is worth to briefly discuss
the dynamics of foreign inequality. Figure 4 shows a U-shape relationship between ω
and both dimensions of foreign inequality, with the declining part dominating the
increasing one. The economic intuition can be easily grasped because it follows from
the same mechanisms at work for the domestic region. In this case the wage-stealing
effect simply operates in the opposite direction: foreign entry in innovation races in a
sector leads to a larger foreign production and higher demand for unskilled workers,
and hence to a lower skill premium. The increasing part of the U-shaped inequality
response to competition is generated by the increase in the number of sectors where
foreign firms innovate, which raises foreign demand for skills.
I conclude this section assessing the quantitative relevance of the channels
described above in accounting for the observed increase in the US wage inequality.
Recall that the skill premium increases in the data by 21.8% and residual inequality
increases by 30% in the period between 1979 and 1995. In the same period the index
of international competition shown in Figure 3 raises from 0.425 to 0.69, suggesting
that the foreign region, Japan and Europe in the data, was progressively catching up
with the USA in the race for global innovation leadership. Taking this index as a
measure of ω , I now quantify the effects of the observed increase in ω on the two
measures of inequality. Table 3 summarizes the results.
The increase in international competition observed in the data accounts for about
16% of the 21.8% increase in the US skill premium and about 45% of the observed
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increase in residual inequality. Notice that the particular form of the skill premium sD
adopted in (29) biases downward the effects of increasing international competition
on the skill premium. Since, skilled wages are computed as wHD times the average
ability level of the skilled workforce θ θD D0( ), when wHD increases and θ0D decreases,
agents with lower abilities enter the skilled workforce reducing its average skill level
θ θD D0( ) and, consequently, the average skill premium. Unskilled wages instead are not
proportional to the average ability of the unskilled workforce, hence, the effects of
changes in ω on the skill premium shown in Table 3 should be interpreted as a fairly
conservative quantitative evaluation.
Finally, Figure 4 shows that as ω increases from 0.425 to 0.69, the skill premium and
residual inequality in the foreign region decrease, but quantitatively the size of this
effect is fairly small. Although the scope of the paper is not to explain the dynamics of
inequality in the foreign region, it is worth highlighting that the model’s predictions
are not at odds with the evidence on foreign inequality. In fact, there is consensus that
wage inequality in these countries is fairly stable and in some cases declining in the
period of analysis. Fuchs-Schuendeln et al. (2010) find a declining education premium
and a stable residual wage variance in Germany between 1982 and 1995. Similar
results can be found in Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010) for Spain, but the data
are limited to the 1990s. Domeij and Floden (2010) report sharp declines of both
measures of inequality for Sweden in the period 1975–1995. Kambayashi et al. (2008)
and Kawaguchi and Mori (2008), show that inequality in Japan is stable or slightly
declining in our period of analysis. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) find a stable educa-
tion premium in Italy but an increasing residual wage variance.
Although the model’s predictions shown in Figure 4 suggest that inequality
decreases in Japan and Europe as ω increases from 0.425 to 0.69, in the previous
section we have shown analytically that the presence of offshoring introduces a new
channel that can potentially lead to an increase in inequality in both regions. This can
counterbalance the negative effect shown in Figure 4 and potentially yield stable or
even increasing inequality in the set of countries labelled the foreign region.
Offshoring
I now turn to the quantitative analysis of the economy with offshoring, featuring
global labor markets for both types of workers. I calibrate this version of the model
using the same externally calibrated parameters of the benchmark model without
offshoring summarized earlier in section 6, and recalibrate the four “internal” param-
eters (α, A, κ, ε) targeting the same statistics of the benchmark model (growth rate,
innovation/gross domestic product (GDP), the skill premium and residual inequality)
but using the relevant moments computed for the model with offshoring. The new
calibrated parameters are, α = 0.2, A = 1.12, κ = 0.1.49 and ε = 0.9, Table 4 shows the fit
of the model.
In Table 5, I repeat the exercise of computing the share of the observed increase in
inequality that can be accounted for by an increase in ω from 0.425 to 0.69.
Table 3. International Competition and Inequality: No Offshoring
Model Data Explained
Skill premium % change (1979–1995) 0.0331 0.218 0.158
Residual inequality % change (1979–1995) 0.136 0.3 0.453
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In this economy the observed increase in international competition can explain
about 7% of the increase in the skill premium, and about 20% of the growth in
residual inequality. Thus this version of the model accounts for a smaller portion of
the increase in inequality than the economy with local labor markets. Compared with
the latter, here factor-price equalization implies that the increase in international
competition does not trigger any wage-stealing effect. The only channel through which
changes in international competition affect inequality in the leading region is by
increasing the global efficiency of innovation and the results in Table 5 show the quan-
titative relevance of this channel only. In the economy without offshoring, instead, the
efficiency effect does not operate but wage-stealing is active and seems to be quantita-
tively powerful.
A unified framework accounting for all these channels is the ideal next step needed
to obtain a more complete assessment of the link between foreign technological com-
petition and inequality. Available data show that the US economy is closer to the local
labor market scenario than to the perfect offshoring model, but the share of offshored
production and innovation is far from negligible. The BEA International Investment
Statistics show that the employment share of US affiliates of multinational corpora-
tions is on average 26% in the period I focus on, and the R&D employment share of
US affiliates is on average 12%. Using this data to calibrate an hybrid version of the
model featuring partial offshoring is an interesting task for future research.
Offshoring could be obtained as an equilibrium result driven by the balance between
the costs (offshoring costs) of producing abroad and the benefits (saving trade costs).
This would on the other hand enrich the set up with an interesting feature of the real
world but would also complicate it severely. There are several models in the literature
with equilibrium offshoring, but they mostly feature exogenous technology. Recent
attempts of modeling offshoring within an endogenous technical change framework
are Naghavi and Ottaviano (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2010) and Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2011). In these papers countries are symmetric, while the framework
used here presents the additional difficulty of studying asymmetric countries. In a
companion paper, I have undertaken a first step toward modeling costly offshoring in
a quality-ladder growth model with asymmetric countries (Borota et al., 2015).
Table 4. Offshoring: Model Fit (1979)
Moments Data Source Benchmark model
Targeted
Skill premium 0.4 Autor et al. (2008) 0.52
Growth rate 0.011 Corrado et al. (2009) 0.01
R&D/GDP 0.09 Corrado et al. (2009) 0.12
Variance log wages 0.05 Heathcote et al. (2010) 0.17
Table 5. International Competition and Inequality: Offshoring
Model Data Explained
Skill premium % change (1979–1995) 0.015 0.218 0.069
Residual inequality % change (1979–1995) 0.061 0.3 0.203
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7. Conclusion
In this paper I have built a quality-ladder model of endogenous technical change in
which a backward region progressively catches up with the leading region by
increasing the number of industries in which its firms participate in innovation races
for global leadership. Entry of firms from the lagging country in global innovation
races increase innovation and wage inequality in the leading region through two
channels: the wage-stealing and the global efficiency channels. The increase in inter-
national technological competition produced by foreign entry in innovation leads to
global market-share losses for the leading region, and to lower production
(unskilled) wages. This wage-stealing effect increases the skill premium directly by
reducing unskilled wages, and indirectly by reducing the cost of innovation, the skill-
using activity in the economy. Moreover, an increase in the skill premium induces
workers with lower ability to acquire education and, since skilled wages are propor-
tional to workers’ ability, raises wage dispersion. Offshoring production and innova-
tion leads to equalization of factor prices across regions and neutralizes the wage-
stealing effect. With global labor markets, fiercer international competition produces
higher inequality by increasing the efficiency of global innovation: if innovation
technology is characterized by decreasing returns at the regional level, as empirical
evidence suggests, foreign entry in innovation leads to a more efficient international
allocation of resources, thereby increasing the global demand for skills and the skill
premium worldwide.
The quantitative analysis uses OECD data on R&D investment in manufacturing
sectors to build a model-specific measure of the degree of international technological
competition between the global leader, the USA, and its followers, Japan and Europe.
This measure is then used to assess the relevance of the observed change in interna-
tional competition for the dynamics of US wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. I
find that the increase in foreign competition observed in the data accounts for up to
one-sixth of the surge in the US skill premium and up to about one-half of the
increase in residual inequality between 1979 and 1995.
As discussed in the introduction, there are several channels contributing to the evo-
lution of US wage inequality, each accounting for a portion of the observed increase.
For instance, Burstein and Vogel (2010) study the effects of trade on wages in a quan-
titative trade model showing that the increase in trade and multinational production
observed between 1966 and 2006 accounts each for about one-ninth of the increase in
the US skill premium in that period. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) perform a
similar quantitative analysis with a model of trade and endogenous technical change
showing that trade liberalization accounts for about one-fifth of the increase in the US
skill premium between 1970 and 1990. These numbers, together with the results of this
paper, suggest that there are several plausible and quantitatively relevant channels
linking globalization and wage inequality, each explaining only a fraction of the
overall increase shown in the data.
Further research could extend the model by removing the assumptions of costless
trade and offshoring, thus allowing for a joint analysis of trade liberalization, lower
costs of offshoring, and increasing technological competition. This would provide a
unifying framework to asses the role of these key features of globalization in shaping
the distribution of wages. Removing the assumption of costless trade by introducing
variable trade costs is straightforward, while introducing costly offshoring would be an
interesting challenge. Endogenous offshoring decisions would provide a more realistic
benchmark economy by making the share of offshorable activities an equilibrium
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result (as e.g. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2011;
Burstein and Vogel, 2010). This economy would be a combination of the two extreme
economies studied in this paper, featuring both the wage-stealing and the efficiency
effect of fiercer international competition.
Appendix
Proofs
Proof for proposition 2 Let C = (cD + cF)/λ be global consumption, from (26) we
know that 2Γ(θ0) = C, thus θ0 = Γ−1(C/2). Using this expression for θ0 into (6) we
obtain wH = σ/[Γ−1(C/2) − γ]. Substituting this into (26) and (28) we obtain a system in
three unknowns, C, IgD, In.
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Totally differentiating equations (A1)–(A3) with respect to (w.r.t.) C, IgD, In and ω we
obtain
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where Φ1, Φ2, Φ3 are the derivative of (A1) w.r.t. C, IgD, and In respectively, Φ4, Φ5, Φ6
are the derivative of (A2) w.r.t. C, IgD and In respectively, Φ7, Φ8, Φ9, Φ10 are the deriva-
tive of (A3) w.r.t. C, IgD, In and ω respectively. It is easy to show that the following
results hold: Φ1 > 0, Φ2 = 0, Φ3 < 0, Φ4 > 0, Φ5 < 0, Φ6 = 0, Φ8 < 0, Φ9 < 0 and Φ10 > 0. As I
show below the sign of, Φ7 is not relevant for the purpose of this proof. While Φ10 > 0 if
21− >α I In gD, which can be proved as follows: combining (A1) and (A2) we obtain
I I n I I ngD gD n nD( ) + −( ) = ( ) + −( )− −αα ααρ ρ1 1 2 ,
which if 21− =α I In gD yields 1 = 21−α, which holds only for a linear R&D technology, that
is α = 0. For any 0 < α < 1, (A1) and (A2) are satisfied only if 21− >α I In gD, which allows
us to proof that Φ10 is positive. Once we signed all of the Φs it is easy to show that
det(Φ) > 0, and using Cramer’s rule we obtain
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Since 2Γ(θ0) = C and wH = σ/(θ0 − γ), we can conclude that increases in ω raise the
share of skilled workers in the economy, and increase the skill premium and residual
inequality.
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Notes
1. The employment share of US affiliates of multinational corporations is on average 26%, and
the R&D employment share of US affiliates is on average 12% in these years (BEA Interna-
tional Investment Statistics).
2. There is strong empirical evidence on decreasing returns to innovation at the country level
(see e.g. Hall et al., 1986; Kortum, 1993; Blundell et al., 2002).
3. For simplicity, I abstract from offshoring costs, as they are not necessary to show the emer-
gence of this new channel. Costly offshoring though can have an important role in affecting the
quantitative results, as I discuss below.
4. Social and institutional changes have also contributed to the dynamics of wage and income
inequality in the US and other countries. A line of research have studied the link between the
rapid increase in assortative mating and income inequality across households (e.g. Fernandez
and Rogerson, 2001; Fernandez et al., 2005; Greenwood et al., 2005). Another line of research
has shown that changes in labor market institutions, such as unionization, minimum wage,
firing restrictions and unemployment benefits, has contributed to the increase in several
dimensions of inequality (e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Koeniger et al.,
2007).
5. The main argument made by the innovation policy literature is that goverments can stimu-
late entry in innovation by either providing, through procurement, a sufficiently large market
size that allows firms to pay the high fixed entry costs and bear the high risk of investing in
innovation; or facilitate commercial innovation through tax subsidies and technology transfer
(see e.g. Hart, 1998; Hausman and Rodrik, 2003). For an in-depth discussion of innovation and
industrial policy theories and evidence, see Fagerberg et al. (2004) and Harrison and
Rodriguez-Claire (2010).
6. Rodriguez-Claire (2007) and Hsieh and Ossa (2011) focus on quantifying the welfare effects
of international technology diffusion/competition as well, using different data and frameworks.
7. Davis and Naghavi (2011) study the effects of offshoring on innovation and wage inequality
in an occupational choice model with heterogenous workers’ skills and endogenous growth.
8. Juhn et al. (1993) and Lemieux (2006) provide comprehensive empirical analyses of the evo-
lution of residual wage dispersion in the USA.
9. In the period 1973–1995, R&D expenditures in these countries represent between 95% and
98% of global R&D investment in manufacturing (OECD ANBERD Rev.2, 2005).
10. Since returns to schooling may reflect returns to individual ability, the changes observed in
Figure 1 might be driven by composition effects (changes in the distribution of ability across
education groups). As shown in Acemoglu (2002) and Acemoglu and Autor (2010) composition
effects cannot account for the observed dynamics of the wage structure in the last 30 years.
Hence the changes in the returns to schooling shown in the figure can be interpreted as changes
in the true price of skills.
11. Since in the model residual inequality will be defined as the dispersion of wages of edu-
cated workers, the series for residual inequality in Figure 1 is obtained considering only wage
dispersion among workers with a college degree or higher. The share of the total variance of
residuals attributable to educated workers is obtained from Lemieux (2006) decomposition.
The total variance of residuals is taken from Eckstein and Nagypal (2004).
12. Similar results are obtained with a weighted average, where sectors’ shares of total R&D
are used as weights. The US weighted share, for instance, decreases from 57% in 1973 to 44% in
1995.
13. The OECD classifies sectors in high-tech, medium high-tech, medium low-tech and low-
tech according to their R&D intensity (see Hatzichronoglou, 1997). High-tech and medium-
high-tech industries represent 77% of total manufacturing R&D in the period considered.
14. The grid is chosen in order for the bottom threshold to yield a low and the top threshold to
yield a high Herfindhal index of market concentration. More precisely, when the US share of
global R&D is 0.35 and the rest of the market is equally spread between the Japan and Europe,
the Herfindhal index for a sector (adjusted for the number of countries) is 0.01, which indicates
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a highly competitive market. While when the US R&D share is 0.68 the Herfindhal index is
about 0.18, which is the level above which a market is considered highly concentrated.
15. Using the average index allows me to address the problem of sensitivity to small changes
that fixing one specific threshold might produce.
16. I assume that if there are two goods with the same quality-adjusted price, consumers will
buy only the good with higher quality.
17. It is easy to show that the above parameters cannot be chosen independently, but they must
satisfy δ = n/(enV − 1) and β = nenV/(enV − 1) in order for the number of births at time t to match
the number of deaths at t + V.
18. This way of modeling the accumulation of skills has been first introduced by Findlay and
Kierzkowski (1993), and extended to heterogeneous agents by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999).
19. An incumbent considering investing in innovation needs to subtract its present monopoly
profits from the payoff of successful innovation, whereas followers have zero profits before
innovating. It follows that the value of innovation for the followers is higher than for the leader.
See Aghion and Howitt (1992) for a discussion of the Arrow effect and Cozzi (2007) for a
recent interpretation.
20. Without this assumption if a leader experiences successive innovations, followers will be
pushed out of the market permanently. The assumption of immediate diffusion of the old pro-
duction technology is discussed in Glass (1997) and widely used both in North–North models of
trade and growth (e.g. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999), and in North–South models (Glass,
1997; Glass and Saggi, 1998).
21. If the cost for foreign firms is instead always lower than that of domestic firms, we would
have a less general and less interesting equilibrium with only foreign firms producing in neck-
and-neck sectors.
22. There is strong empirical evidence on the nonlinearity of the relation between innovation
activity of a country (measured using patent data) and its R&D investment. Working with a
large sample of US firm-level data, Hall et al. (1986) find an elasticity of patents to R&D of
0.5. The evidence surveyed in Kortum (1993) suggests point estimates for the patent/R&D
elasticity in the range 0.1–0.6. More recently, Blundell et al. (2002) found a long-run elasticity
of 0.5.
23. Eaton and Kortum (1999) adopt a similar technology in their multi-country version of the
quality-ladder growth model. They suggest a microfundation for decreasing returns in innova-
tion at the country level based on heterogeneous ability workers. As investment in innovation
increases in a country, workers of lower ability will be used and productivity will decline. This
microfundation applies to this model as well.
24. This specification of the difficulty index is a reduced-form version of the solution to the
scale effects problem based on the assumption that aggregate R&D becomes more difficult
over time as it is spread over more varieties (see e.g. Howitt, 1999). In my simplified version of
this approach, population growth mimics the expansion in the variety of goods.
25. The goods in ω would be those for which the technology gap between the most advanced
country (home) and the laggards (foreign) is sufficiently small to allow the laggards to effec-
tively compete in innovation with the leaders.
26. See Impullitti (2010) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
27. The effect of changes in ω on innovation per sector can be attributed to the higher obsoles-
cence of innovation produced by foreign entry.
28. An (1998) shows that the the left-truncated variance of logconcave distributions decreases
in the truncation point. A probability distribution is logconcave if the log of its pdf is concave.
Many common distributions are logconcave: the normal, uniform, logistic, extreme value, χ, χ2
and Laplace. Other common distributions such as the power, Weibul, γ, χ, χ2 and β are
logconcave for values of their parameters larger than one (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).
Logconcavity is only a sufficient condition for the variance of a left-truncated distribution to be
decreasing in the truncation point. The Pareto distribution, for instance, is not logconcave but
its variance is decreasing in the left-truncation point.
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29. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) introduce costly offshoring in a North–South quality-
ladder model in which only the North innovates while the South imitates. A first attempt at
introducing costly multinational activity in multi-county quality-ladder growth models where
firms from both countries innovate can be found in Borota et al. (2015).
30. This distribution is often used in quantitative models with heterogeneous agents, to match
wage, income and earning dispersion. See e.g. Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Antunes et al. (2008).
31. I take the upper value of the range because the numerical solution is more robust with
high λs.
32. I consider that agents choose whether to go to college at age 18, so that the 18 years old
cohort in 1979 is represented by people born in 1961, and life expectancy at birth in 1961 in the
USA is 70 years. I also include retirment years into working life assuming that pensions are pro-
portional (equal for simplicity) to wages during working life.
33. In the present framework with quality-improving goods, growth is interpreted as the
increase over time of the consumer’s utility level, which is pinned down by the growth rate of
quality. It is easy to show that the growth rate is
g
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34. It includes R&D, computer software, and investment in a set of activities aimed at improv-
ing existing goods, such as, advertising, design, marketing, etc.
35. Notice that the domestic innovation per firm in gap sectors IgD increases for low levels of ω
and then it decreases. The increase in IgD is a general equilibrium result produced by the
optimal allocation of domestic innovation investment between neck-and-neck and gap sectors.
This additional innovation effect of competition is, though, quantitatively of second order with
respect to the increase in InD: the former increases by about 10% as ω goes from 0.425 to 1,
while the latter grows by more than 250%. Thus the relevant source of the increase in the rela-
tive demand of skills is innovation in neck-and-neck industries.
36. Notice that, although the calibrated ability distribution is not logconcave (ε = 0.9), the simu-
lation in Figure 4 shows that the variance of skilled wages increases as the cutoff θ0D declines.
As discussed above, a logconcave ability distribution is only a sufficient condition for the wage
dispersion to be decreasing in the ability cutoff.
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